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Babette Babich

Nietzsche's Antichrist: The Birth of Modern
Science out of the Spirit of Religion

Nietzsche argued that the Greeks were in possessions of every theoretical,
mathematical, logical, and technological antecedent for the development
of what could be modern science. But if they had all these necessary prerequisites what else could they have needed? Not only had the ancient
Greeks no religious world-view antagonistic to scientific inquiry, they
also lacked the Judeo-Christian promissory ideal of salvation in a future
life (after death). Subsequently, when Greek culture had been irretrievably lost, what Nietzsche regarded as the "decadent" Socratic ideal of reason ultimately and in connection with the preludes of religion and alchemy developed into modern science and its attendant ideal of progress
and redemption not in the afterlife but in "the future."

In point of fact, one is not philologist and physician
without being anti-Christian as well. As philologist one
peers behind the "holy books", as physician behind the
physiological depravity of the typical Christian. The doctor says "uncurable", the philologist says "fraud"
(AC 47)

The Spirit of Science
Posing the logical and conceptual question of the genesis and development of modern scientific culture beginning with his first book on
The Birth of Tragedy through to the very end of his productive life
with The Antichrist, Nietzsche challenges our assumptions regarding
the continuous development of modern science as such, l the path of
1

See Friedrich Nietzsche, Kritische Studien-Ausgabe, ed. Giorgi Colli and
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scientific progress, as we assume science "progresses" along a single
"sure" road-as Kant puts it in the second preface to the Critique of
Pure Reason. 2 Nietzsche contends that the 'Pre-Platonic' philosophers, Thales and Anaximander, Heraclitus and Empedocles, were
well advanced along this path, including the Alexandrian scientists
of the first three centuries B.C.E., Euclid and Hippocrates, Aristarchus and Eratosthenes, Archimedes, Hipparchus, etc. But ancient
Greek science would be shattered by a change akin to the decisive
triumph of Socrates and Euripides over ancient tragedy. Nietzsche
makes this striking claim at the very end of his The Antichrist and
the reason would have ev.;;:rything to do with the rise of the singular
new tradition that also elicits his lamentation: "Two thousand years,
and not a single new god."3 Nietzsche's account manifestly differs
from the standard story of the opposition between science and religion. For Christianity, with its linear promise of salvation now gives
rise to modern science replete with its own analogous assurances of
precisely techno-scientific redemption. Here I explore Nietzsche's
claim when he writes, with explicit reference to science: "Everything
essential had been found in order to begin to go to work."4
Something had to have intervened because although everything
had been ready to go, in the Kantian sense, of the conditions for its
possibility, what would become modern science was not to develop
for centuries more - a thousand years if Duhem and others are right
about medieval science, a few hundred years more if we prefer to
follow the standard story of the scientific revolution.
It is in the context of this twofold loss (of both ancient tragedy
and ancient Greek science) that I seek to unpack Nietzsche's rueful
musing in The Antichrist: "The whole work of the ancient world in
vain."s Counter the standard readings which would limit the reawaMazzino Montinari (Berlin: de Cruyter, 1980) lKSAj, vol. 1, p. 804, 813; and

see KSA 8, p. 405.
2 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der rein en Vernunft (Hamburg: Meiner, 1993),
p.14ff.
3 Nietzsche Der Antichrist lAC], §19; KSA 6, 185.
4 "Alles Wesentliche war gefunden, urn an die Arbeit gehn zu kennen." AC
59; KSA 6, p. 248.
5 Friedrich Nietzsche, AC §59; KSA 6, p. 247.
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kening of antiquity to the Renaissance, Nietzsche, who had hoped in
his first book on tragedy and music for a 19 th century rebirth of the
possibilities of the ancient world, now suggests that everything has
gone to ground, gone to grass.
Many Nietzsche scholars have been disinclined to read Nietzsche
on ancient science, and even after my own study on Nietzsche's Philosophy of Science 6 but also in spite of the now more than half a
dozen sizable book collections dedicated to the theme of Nietzsche
and science? most philosophers (and philologists, as most Nietzsche
scholars tend to be literary historians rather than philosophers these
days) are convinced that NJetzsche has nothing to offer reflections on
science. To date and despite the attempts of younger thinkers, simply
to argue for a connection between Nietzsche and science only meets
resistance, in spite of Nietzsche's own dramatically explicit characterization of his first book on tragedy as haVing framed nothing less
than what he named" a new problem ... the problem of science itself,
science considered for the first time as problematic, as questionable/'s
Part of the reason for this opposition is surely Nietzsche's scientific formation as a scholar of classical philology. Even in this his own
field, Nietzsche is rarely read as any kind of 'authority' on the anBabette Babich, Nietzsche's Philosophy of Science: Reflecting Science on
the Ground of Art and Life (Albany: State University of New York Press,
1994). An updated edition appears as Nietzsches Wissenschaftsphilosophie

6

(Oxford: Peter Lang, 2011).
See Babette Babich (with R. S. Cohen), ed., Nietzsche, Theories of Knowledge and Critical Theory: Nietzsche and the Sciences 1 (Boston Studies in the
Philosophy of Science 203) (Dordrecht: Kluwer 1999) and its companion volume Nietzsche, Epistemology and Philosophy of Science; II (Boston Studies
in the Philosophy of Science 204) (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999). Helmut Heit
discusses "Nietzsche and the Sciences I and II: Programmatic Concerns after
Babich and Cohen," in: New Nietzsche Studies 9, 1/2 (Fall 2013 & Fall 2014),
pp. 169-177. See further the contributions to Gunter Abet Marco Brusotti,
and Helmut Heit, eds., Nietzsches Wissenschaftsphilosophie. Hintergriinde,
Wirkungen und Aktualitiit (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2012) as well as Carlo GentiIi &: Cathrin Nielsen, eds., Der Tod Gottes und die Wissenschaft: Zur Wissenschaftskritik Nietzsches (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2010) among more recent
collections along with several monographs on Nietzsche's so-called middle
period that mention the word 'science' in their titles.
8 Friedrich Nietzsche, Die Geburt der Tragodie [GTl, § ii; KSA 1, p. 13.
7
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cients or as if he were an expert philologist. 9 This is absurd not least
because and certainly at the outset of his career he was one of the
more conventionally recognized new scholars by the leading scholars
of his time. Nietzsche had formidable training as a philologist, he
studied with the best men of his day and enjoyed their best endorsement and made notable achievements, including canonic contributions to his field, especially prosody.lO For this reason, that is,
although his expertise in philology is undeniable,ll while Nietzsche
is read in philosophy (although in Europe as a whole and especially in
Germany there are increasingly fewer university professors who specialize in his work), he r~mains unread in classics or ancient philology.12 For this reason many scholars of antiquity who work on ancient Greek science will never have read his work.
I develop other aspects of this argument in Babette Babich, "Nietzsche's
Philology and the Science of Antiquity: On the Genealogies of Ancient
Science," in: Helmut Heit and Anthony Jensen, eds., Nietzsche's Value as a
Scholar of Antiquity (London: Broadview, 2014), pp. 233-262.
10 See for a discussion and further references Babette Babkh, "The Birth of
Tragedy: Lyric Poetry and the Music of Words, II in: Babette Babich, Words in
Blood, Like Flowers (Albany: SUNY Press, 2006), p. 37 ff. as well as, for
further literature, my essay, "Future Past: The Gay Science, Thus Spoke
Zarathustra, and Eternity," Agonist, VoL VI, Issues 1 & 2 (Spring and Fall,
2013): 1-27.
!1 Jaap Mansfeld and David T. Runia, Aiftiana: The Method and Intellectual
Context of a Doxographer: The Sources. Volume I (Brill: 1997) note that
Nietzsche was not only a contemporary of Hermann Diels in the circle established around Ritschl (pp. 93ff.) but discuss the relevance of the Lachmannian
"method" and Nietzsche's familiarity with the scientific elements of New
Testament criticism (p. 117). Wolfgang RolSler notes that Diels had originally
hoped to collaborate with Nietzsche. Cf. RofSler, "Hermann Diels und die
Fragmente der Vorsokratiker" in: Annette M. Bertschi and Colin G. King,
eds., Die modernen Vater der Antike. die Entwicklung der Altertumswissenschaften an Akademie und Universitaet in Berlin des 19. /ahrhunderts.
(Berlin: de Gruyter, 2009), pp. 369-396, particularly pp. 374ff.
12 The one exception, again (see note 9 above) is prosody but even there
Nietzsche is relegated to a footnote and it is common to misrepresent
Nietzsche's own claims for 'music' with respect to his first book-I try to
unpack these claims in the last three chapters of The Hallelujah Effect: Philosophical Reflections on Music, Performance Practice, and Technology (Surrey: Ashgate, 2013).

9
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Indeed, Nietzsche's discoveries seem to require that we ourselves
rediscover them in his own writings and add them again and again to
ancient scholarship, whether with respect to the tragic artwork, lyric
poetry, theoretical reflections on philological method, and above all
with regard to science as such.
For these and other reasons, independently of Nietzsche, the
mathematician and ancient historian, Lucio Russo has made the case
for an original scientific "revolution," accomplished as early as 300
BC but subsequently "forgotten."13 While Nietzsche follows a tradition of scholarship that would set the date back and if he also details
different achievements anp if other contemporary scholars in addition to Russo have also made comparable claims, 14 Russo's claim deserves our attention as much for its documentation as for its sheer
conventionality: showing that the Greeks were more advanced both
mathematically and in engineering technolOgies than traditional
scholarship has supposed. Confining his claims to today's flady positivist historiology-which is increasingly the mode-Russo tracks
the scientific contributions of later antiquity through the third century of the current era. IS But even earlier than the Alexandrian scholars Russo emphasizes, Charles Kahn some time ago in his invaluable,
Anaximander and the Origins of Cosmology, 16 as well as, more recently, Robert Hahn, Dirk Couprie, and other scholars have been
making important contributions to a growing understanding of
Greek science, an understanding that, so I argue here, wouJd have
been advanced in different ways by Nietzsche himself were scholars
familiar, as they are not at all familiar, with his contributionsY
See here Lucio Russo, The Forgotten Revolution; How Science Was Born
in 300 Be and Why it Had to Be Reborn, trans. Silvio Levy (Berlin: Springer,
2005; originally in Italian, 1996).
14 See Gino Loria, Le Sdenze Estate nell'antica Greda, 5 vols., 2nd ed. (Milan; Hoepli, 1914).
15 Quite to the contrary Hence and Russo's critics argue that he seems to
attribute almost every level of mathematical and theoretical sophistication
to them.
16 Charles Kahn, Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1960).
17 This work remains to be done and the current classicist scholars who write
on Nietzsche, like Glenn Most and James Porter and others, can appear to
13
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Yet one cannot merely add Nietzsche and stir. Thus I once found
myself compelled to point out that reading Nietzsche on the philosophy of science required more than a change in our views of Nietzsche
but and much, much rather, our understanding of philosophy of
science as such. IS In other words, to read Nietzsche on science entails
that we do philosophy of science differently. The result: a philosophy
of science that would be, perhaps for the first time, a critical philosophy or even a whole range of critical philosophies of science. 19
It only compounds matters that Nietzsche's reflections on ancient
Greek science radically depart from the way we think about that tradition (in part this may' be why we find it hard to see what he writes
about Greek science). For Nietzsche, contra Russo, the achievements
of what Nietzsche called Hellenism, i. e., of what he also call the
"Alexandrians," reflects less the inception of a revolution to come
than it outlines what would have been a different tradition of Greek
science in eclipse, effectively speaking, from the start. Inasmuch as
Nietzsche's approach to history does not have to wait for a Herbert
Butterfield to eschew non-presentist elements, and hence qua histOrically minded, Nietzsche emphasizes the specifically "Alexandrian" decadence" he argued to have been of a piece with Aristotle's
JJ

serve as monitors ambitioning to keep Nietzsche from having any bearing on
their own respective fields. In the past Hugh Lloyd-Jones could count as an
exception along with William Arrowsmith. Intriguingly, Jonathan Barnes,
the specialist in ancient philosophy is an exception perhaps because he undertook to look at Nietzsche's own expert engagement with Diogenes Laertius.
One of the central reasons 1 call attention to Nietzsche's engagement with
Lucian beyond the obvious (the source for Nietzsche's iibermensch is taken
from Lucian's Journey to Hell [Kataplous] departs from this expert engagement), as a contemporary of Diogenes Laertius: an expert in the latter will
know the former. See Babich, "Becoming and Purification: Empedodes, Zarathustra's Dbermensch, and Lucian's Tyrant," in: Vanessa Lemm, ed.,
Nietzsche and the Becoming of Life (New York: Fordham University Press,
2014), pp. 245-261i 359-368.
1R Babette Babich, Nietzsche's Philosophy of Science, 1.
19 See, beginning with a review of nothing other than philological methodology, Babette Babich, "Towards a Critical Philosophy of Science: Continental
Beginnings and Bugbears, Whigs and Waterbears," in: International Journal
of the Philosophy of Science 24/4 (December 2010), pp. 343-391.
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and Plato's contribution to philosophy.2° In his earlier wor~
Nietzsche had traced the trajectory of what he called nihilism
through the 19th century genealogy of the modern technological and
consumerist preoccupation with distraction and satisfaction back to
nothing less than the initially Hellenistic" demand for such an Alexandrine earthly happiness." 21
Like Russo inter alia, Nietzsche frames his observations on the
foundations of science and mathematics within a tradition of scholarship on ancient philosophy. Invoking the triumphant "the spirit of
science" manifest in the person of Socrates (whom Nietzsche regarded as the demon of re!lson itself) and Euripides who revolutionized (and who was, for Nietzsche, responsible for the death of) the
tragic cult in this same rational spirit (ergo tragedy 'dies at its own
hand'), the result sacrificed the achievement of antiquity as a whole
only to install in its place a new tradition, the Judeao-Christian tradition: "I have no word that could articulate my feeling about something so monstrous [so Ungeheueres]."22 This sentence is virtually
impossible to unpack and in the remainder of the essay to follow; I
hope to illuminate it by reflecting what Nietzsche says about science
in antiquity.
Nietzsche's references to architecture are extensive, and I don't
have time to review these other than to note that Nietzsche's sustained engagement with what he called monumental history, and
hence precisely with buildings and monuments, include metaphors
of decadence, literally falling statues, beyond Aristotle's famous reference and paralleling the architectural investigations of Robert
Hahn and othersP And then there is music for Nietzsche, where
The history of science is often inevitably given a Comtean rather than
Hegelian expression. See Peter Dear's account of George Sarton, the long
time editor of Isis, in his "The History of Science and the History of the
Sciences: George Sarton, Isis, and the Two Cultures," in: Isis 100 (2009),
pp.89-93.
21 Ibid.
22 Friedrich Nietzsche, AC §59; KSA 6, p. 247 f.
23 See here Robert Hahn, Anaximander and the Architects: The Contributions of Egyptian and Greek Architectural Technologies to the Origins of
Greek Philosophy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001) and

2Q
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Nietzsche's own studies of Ancient Greek lyric poetry concentrated
on quantitation. Important too and in addition to the more mainstream and received discussions of mathematics in antiquity (Brumbaugh, etc), we might add the 'new' archaeologicallayerings of Kitder's mathematic-musical reflections 24 and we can also add Jay
Kennedy's widely trumpeted in the press ('wide' is a relative term
but scholarship mostly passes without popular notice) for his reinvention or rediscovery of work done for many years (by so many
others) on stichometry in Plato's dialogues (i.e., on the very music
of the text in a sense related to the "music" about which Nietzsche
writes in reference to tragedy). 25 And just in addition, although this is

see too Dirk Couprie, Robert Hahn, and Gerard Naddaf (eds.), Anaximander
in Context: New Studies in the Origin. of Greek Philosophy (Albany State
University of New York Press, 2003) as well as Indra Kagis McKewen, Socrates Ancestor: An Essay on Architectural Beginnings (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1993).
See Friedrich Kittler, "Number and Numeral," in: Theory, Culture & Society 23, 7-8 (2006), pp. 51-61 as well as Kittler's Musik und Mathematik.
Band 1: Hellas, Teil2: Eros (Paderborn: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2009) and
Band 1: Hellas, Teill: Aphrodite (Paderborn: wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2006).
25 Kennedy'S claim to priority here works largely because he eschews references and by failing to credit others ingeniously finds that he has made a
discovery. The tactic depends for its success upon what Nietzsche called a
"failure of philology"-i.e., no one knows any better. Thus see Eva Brann
(who puts her claim into the very title of her study), "The Musk of the
Republic: Essays on Socrates' Conversations and Plato's Writings" as well as
John Bremer's On Plato's Polity (Houston: Institute of Philosophy, 1984) and
several essays laying out his earlier work, especially JlPlato, Pythagoras, and
Stichometry," in: Stichting Pythagoras: Pythagoras Foundation Newsletter
15 (December 2010) in addition to Ernst McClain's The Pythagorean Plato:
Prelude to the Song Itself (York Beach: Nicolas-Hays, 1978) as well as
McClain's The Myth of Invariance: The Origin of the Gods, Mathematics,
and Music from the 15g Veda to Plato (York Beach: Nicolas-Hays, 1978)
where McClain himself gave credit to scholars of ancient musicology, and so
on. See for discussion and further references, the third part of Babette Babich,
The Hallelujah Effect and, as prolegomena, "The Hallelujah Effect: Archaeology of a Harmony in Three Parts," in: Glimpse. The Journal of the Society
for Phenomenology and Media (forthcoming). See here: Richard Janko, "Reconstructing (again) the Opening of the Derveni Papyrus," in: ZPE 166
(2008), pp. 37-51.

24
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yet more complicated, there is Nietzsche's long standing writing on
causality, deliberately looking backwards and forwards (and in the
process inspiring and anticipating Freud on the workings of the unconscious). Hankinson's study of cause includes several chapters
matching Nietzsche's approaches to the question of causality, including Stoic causality and skepticism. 26 To this one may add ancient
reflections on medical physiology (I have touched on related themes
in my explorations of the techniques of ancient bronze with reference
to Pliny,27 in the context of a review of the mechanical practical technology available in ancient Greece).28
There is indeed an enormous range of connections and interconnections with received scholarship and I mention these facets (and
there are others) to foreground the physical, i. e., the archaeological
artifact (again: Nietzsche's "monumental history"), all in addition to
the sheer scope and power of engineering in the ancient world simply
to outline the context in which Nietzsche could go on to raise the
question of the theoretico-mathematico-Iogical as this includes speSee R. J. Hankinson, Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
27 See, again, Babette Babich, "Die Naturkunde der Griechischen Bronze im
Spiegel des Lebens. Betrachtungen uber Heideggers asthetische Phiinomenologie und Nietzsches agonale Politik," trans. Harald Seubert, in: Gunter Figal,
ed., Internationales Jahrbuch fur Hermeneutik 7 (2008), pp. 127-189. I note
here that this essay appeared in an earlier version in English as "Greek
Bronze: Holding a Mirror to Life," in: Yearbook of the Irish Philosophical
Society 7 (2007), pp. 1-30.
ll! See here both Manfred Barthel's popular account: Die Enkel des Archimedes. Eine etwas andere Kulturgeschichte (Witten: Neuhaus, 1995) as well
as Horst Bredekamp's Antikensehnsucht und Maschinenglauben. Die Geschichte der Kunstkammer und die Zukunft der Kunstgeschichte (Berlin: Wagenbach, 1992), an approach at once stylistically disenchantment-oriented as
well as esoteric. And see too, as already noted, Lucio Russo's The Forgotten
Revolution. On Greek science as indicated in a broader sense, see not only
Arpad Szabo, Das geozentrische Weltbild (Munchen: dtv; 1992), but also,
again, Kahn's Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology, in addition
to Fritz Kraft, Geschichte der Naturwissenschaft I. Die BegTundung einer
Geschichte der Wissenschaft von der Natur dUTch die Grjechen (Freiburg im
Breisgau: Rombach, 1971). In addition, see here, again, the joint work of
Couprie, Hahn, and Naddaf, Anaximander in Context.
26
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cifically scientific methodology: "-methods, one must repeat ten
times, are the essential, as well as being the most difficult, as well as
being that which has habit and laziness against it 10ngest,"29 culminating in Nietzsche's observation in his Antichrist that "[ ... JaU the
scientific methods were already available."30 The point articulated
towards the end of Nietzsche The Antichrist invites us to reflect on
the lack of consequentiality of this entire complex of assembled engineering prowess and mathematical and scientific methodology for
the Greeks.
What on earth happened? The short answer has to do with the
Alexandrian grammarians, t}:te longer answer for Nietzsche has to
do, as everything has to do for Nietzsche with Christianity.
As I have emphasized this elsewhere, "method" attained its acme
-a high point that continues to determine scholarship-with the
"Alexandrian grammarians," a high perfection also attested by an
abundance of scientific (read if one prefers: scholarly) methodologies:
not only theoretical, but mathematical, and technologicaL 31 Nietzsche
asks us to reflect on this as a scientific question-he had been, after
all, raiSing the question of science from the start of his intellectual
life, writing in his "Attempt at a Self-Critique," the later written preFriedrich Nietzsche, AC §59; KSA 6, p. 247.
Ibid. ("aile wissenschaftlichen Methoden waren bereits da. H). In fact as
Nietzsche glosses, developing this parallel still further, Plato and Socrates
may be correlated with what he calls an antagonism to the natural sciences
as such (KSA 7, p. 548), which he explains in terms of the scientific orientation of Epicurus and Pythagoras, especially together with Democritu5 as providing the foundation for the natural sciences. Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, KSA 7,
p.557.
31 Nietzsche's use of the term 'Alexandrinian', so in abundance in his first
book, would merit a study all its own. Here it will have to suffice to cite his
claim as we can perhaps use it to understand the sense of the new title that he
eventually uses to replace the original subtitle of The Birth of Tragedy:
'"Aufklarung' und alexandrinische Bildung ist es-besten FaIls!-, was Philologen wollen. Nicht Hellenenthum" (KSA 8, p. 75; cf. too p. 121). Nicholas
Martin expresses the distinction as one between a kind of bibliographical or
source-scholarly preoccupation and a creative mode in his discussion of Wolf
and the tradition of 'Alterthumswissenschaft' in Nicholas Martin, Nietzsche
and Schiller: Untimely Aesthetics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996),
p.130ff.

29

30
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face to The Birth of Tragedy, that he should be counted as the very
first thinker to raise the question of science "as a question" (even
Heidegger, imitating Nietzsche's thunder in his The Question in the
Wake of Technology, does not exceed him in this). Just what are we to
make of this circumstance?
Why, Nietzsche asks, does modern science, now setting its origination back by centuries, manage to manage to take as long as it takes
to become modern science? What is required for modern science as
we know it? Nietzsche's answer (and this is completely conter-intuitive) is that science requires religion itself: religion of the eschatalogically-oriented Judaeo-Christian kind. But as we all already know:
science and religion are mortal enemies. If this had been Nietzsche's
claim, that is, had Nietzsche simply opposed religion and science,
he'd be merely be one among many other historians of mythos underway to logos. Instead, Nietzsche argues that ancient religion does
not oppose ancient science. In this sense, Nietzsche anticipates more
recent theorists of the history and philosophy of science, beginning
with his almost contemporary, the scientist and philosopher and historian of science, Pierre Duhem and continuing with G. E. R. Lloyd
and others. As Karl Lowith observes, here follOwing Heidegger, this
would be the point of the "Anti-Christian repetition of Antiquity." 32
The Nietzschean project calls for an antidote to the "Alexandrian,"
and it is in this spirt that Nietzsche had somewhat misguidedly imagined Wagner as an "Anti-Alexander"33 in the last of his Untimely
Meditations.
Nietzsche would come not only to relinquish his hopes for
Wagner as ally but also to recommend an entirely different strategy,
seeking less to cut through the complexity of the "Gordian knot of
Greek culture" but and much, much rather, "to retie it again after
having been [so] cut/unravelled."M A similarly nuanced question,
Karl Lowith, Nietzsche's Philosophy of the Eternal Recurrence of the
Same, trans. Harvey Lomax (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997),
p.111.
33 Friedrich Nietzsche, KSA 1, 447; See Karl Lowith, Nietzsche's Philosophy
of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same, p. 111.
32

Ibid. It is in this sense that I hear Nietzsche's early reflection on the state of
the lyric tradition, noting only Pindar as an exception in his Vorlesung: Die

34
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likewise seeking to reweave the strands of Greek culture after the
flatfooted scholarly unraveling of these same strands, forms the core
of Nietzsche's theoretical reflections on the Greek musical artwork or
tragedy. 35
What Nietzsche named the "binding of the scientific impetus"
[Biindigung des Wissenstriebes] became for a time the watchword of
German Nietzsche scholarship in the 1970's and 1980's. A now !al'gely becalmed research project-perhaps as a result of its association
with drives and the will to power-key here is Nietzsche's contention
that modern religion is no enemy of modern science but exactly its
ally as he writes in Thr Gay Science 36 and where he goes on to count
science the "latest and greatest" form of the religio-ascetic ideal at the
conclusion of his On the Genealogy of Morals. 37
Nonetheless, the alliance of science and religion is a marriage just
as reft, to use Nietzsche's original metaphor, as the uneasy union
between Apollo and Dionysus. Already alive to "factual sensibility,"
[Thatsachen-Sinn],38 the ancient Greek empirical sensibility, contrary to Russo's revolutionary idealization of the scientific turn, Col'responded for Nietzsche not to some Archimedean or Eudoxan flash
of inSight but represented an "already centuries-old tradition."39
Contra Russo, this was not a revolution dawning in Hellenistic
Greece but the tail of an already declining comet, complete with a
variety of technologicat scientific schools and traditions of the same.
griechische Lyrik: "Wir stehen auf einem Triimmerfeldi spiirliche Reste.
Vollstiindiges auger Pindar fast gar nicht" (Fruhe Schriften [Munich: Beck,
1994], vol. 5, p. 385).
35 I say nuanced because Nietzsche alludes to this same anti-banausic insight
in his "What is Noble," an emphasis recurring in his understanding of the
Greek relationship to art as part of the ideal of perfecting one's own "statue,"
becoming as it were, a work of art. See here, with specific reference to the
working of sculpture in Nietzsche's texts, Babette Babich "Skulptur [Bildhauerkunst]," in: Christian Niemeyer, ed., Nietzsche Lexikon (Darmstadt:
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2009), pp. 325-328.
36 Friedrich Nietzsche, Frohliche Wissenschaft [FW] §300i KSA 3, p. 539.
37 I develop this further in Babette Babich, Nietzsche's Philosophy of Science,
chapter five.
38 Friedrich Nietzsche, AC §59; KSA 6, p. 248.
39 Ibid.
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As a historian, Nietzsche's claim is that what should compel re·
search attention is what may seem incidental. For Nietzsche, writing
in the traditional and religious context of The Antichrist, what is
significant is that from the start and throughout (apart from a certain unhistorical tendency to historical mythology, i. e., science is
science is science, which matches the assumption that religion is religion is religion), the Greek tradition of natural philosophy or
science was not repressed. In other words, there was no anti-empiricist movement in antiquity. Hence for Nietzsche, there was no parallel, quite contra Russo's title, to the routine account of the scientific
revolution, as politicized a~ it romanticized, as we like to tell ourselves
that story, inventing a parable based on a certain ordering of the solar
system as a simple progression from an ancient geocentric schema
towards the heliocentric account, which latter was already known to
the Greeks, and so deploying our traditional model of the scientific
revolution/persecution in modernity's favorite myth, namely that of
Galileo's suppression by the church.4.{l For Nietzsche, such a supposed
antagonism to the aims of science may not be invoked in antiquity
because not only was there no Christian church but there were no
religious traditions opposing the discoveries and inventions of ancient
Greek engineering and science. 41 To the contrary as the theatrical de-

Although there are classical historians to this day who, rather whiggishly,
continue to assume this, and many of these argue for scholastic readings of
Aristotle (similarly ahistorically). But see Pierre Duhem's To Save the Phenomena: An Essay on the Idea of Physical Theory from Plato to CaWeo,
trans. E. Dolan and C. Maschier (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1969) for historical background. I discuss this in Babette Babich, "Continental
Philosophy of Science: Mach, Duhem, and Bachelard," in: Richard Kearney,
ed., Routledge History of Philosophy: Volume Vlll (London: Routledge,
2003), pp. 175-221, esp. p. 187 f. Feyerabend offers a reading of Calileo and
the church (and politics) including the empirical evidence his telescopes provided (Feyerabend argues that Calileo's argument is not based as we tend to
suppose on 'science'), that cuts nicely to the chase. For Feyerabend, it is
neither hermeneutically nor scientifically rigorous to argue the history of
science 'sub specie aetemitatis' as are inclined to desire. Paul Feyerabend,
Against Method (London: Verso, 1975), p. 106.
11 Note again that that for Nietzsche, the decadence he describes will begin
even before Plato,
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vice deployed for dramatic effect of the deus ex machina would illustrate. 42
The claim shatters two icons of our tribe, namely the ideal of
Galileo's scientific heroism together with similarly ideal readings of
Plato. Was Socrates not put to death for not subscribing to the gods of
the state, which lack of faith is often assumed to have made the second charge against him, corrupting the youth, reduplicative? Nietzsche does not concern himself here with Galileo (and the problem of
Socrates is more complicated). Having authored a study of Greek
religion and as acquainted as he was with the scope of then~contem~
porary philological thought, Nietzsche had yet another question in
mind. Given, as he argued that there was no religion to play the
modern anti-science role, the question that then deserves our attention is why modem science fails to develop from this promising start
in antiquity? It is worth noting his point here in the framework of
scientific progress. Given the availability of the necessary lOgical,
mathematical, theoretical, and even an ample range of practical, engineering prerequisites why did science not develop? All these preconditions would make the difference in the age of science to come
more than a thousand years later, i. e., they were and they would
remain indispensable prerequisites. Nietzsche's point is that all these
preconditions were at hand, already, in Greece and yet-this is the
mystery-they all went nowhere.
We might as well ask whether speaking of the enlightenment (revelation) makes any sense apart from the presupposition of the dark
ages, i. e., the era of the church, and of the same religious superstition
we suppose the mightiest opponent of science to this day? For religion is the key ally as Nietzsche argues, antecedent to, or, as he writes
in The Gay Science, the active prelude to modem science (more on
this below). Indeed, some of the millenarian hopes that we have for
science in the age of the singularity and our ongoing dream of redemption through science and technology demonstrate the still ongoing effects of this origin, the effective birth of modem science out
of the spirit of religion.
I refer here to the history of this term which had its origins in religious
festivals and rites.
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The question and the issues it involves as a question should be
emphasized just because classicists and historians of philosophy tend
not to pose such questions 43 but also because and more perniciously
we take ourselves to know that the relevant answer would have to be
sociaL Thus scholars like to note (without reflecting on the significance of) the vulgar status of the technician or artist or technical
craftsman in the judgment of noble youth in ancient Greece, an
anti-banausic sensibility repeated in philosophy. Nietzsche's distinguishes this ancient sensibility vis-a.-vis the artist in antiquity from
the 19th century cult of art for its own sake as indeed from the artistideal of the "genius." Otht;r scholars collapse the themes (thus severing the Gordian knot of Greek culture, a simplification we pursue
with a good conscience). Hence it is common to read that, and in spite
of their mathematical and technical prowess, the Greeks failed to develop modern science owing to their denigration of the practical, due,
in turn, to their disdain for the empirical (here, just casually, we may
think of the arguments concerning Aristotle's putative scholasticism). Greek diffidence vis-ii-vis science is accordingly argued to derive from a classically anti-banausic tendency, a diffidence which has
made the reception of Kahn's scholarship as indeed of Russo's studies
but especially those of recent scholars44 rather less resounding than
their work merits. It is this paradigm Nietzsche challenges from his
first book to his Antichrist.
The convenient, if simplistic anti-banausic assumptions applied to
ancient science and technology yields the contemporary image of the
Greeks as so many antique Jmandarins': if not themselves horrified
by technology than at the very least innocent of it. To this extent, the
above mentioned studies of Greek scientific technologies cannot but
collide with an entrenched paradigm of primitive antiquity (and these
studies have been despite their exemplary scholarship astonishingly
little received). Nevertheless, to make a related point, any listing of
There are exceptions, Lynn White, David Noble, and even Peter Dear, in
descending order. But see Alistair Crombie and Pierrre Duhem on another
level altogether as well as Alistair Crombie, cited below.
44 Or see Robert Hahn, already cited aboveJ or, further, Dirk L. Couprie, Heaven and Earth in Ancient Greek Cosmology: From Thales to Heraclides Ponticus (Frankfurt am Main: Springer, 2011).
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the machine and theoretical technologies available in Greek and Ro~
man antiquity is stunningly impressive. 4S And as Derek de Sola Price
first brought to popular attention, this technical prowess is most dramatically attested by discovery of the bronze Antikythera mechan~
ism in the year of Nietzsche's death in 1900, not least because the
mechanism itself appears almost "modern" - a bronze disc of layered
and machined gears - so modern indeed that its discovery is akin to
finding Paley's watch, not on the heath as the Scots theologian a~
gued in 1802 (echoing Hume and a much longer tradition), but in
the waters of the Adriatic (we are only todaYi 114 years, arranging
to send specially out(itted divers to the site in question to look for
other artifacts that might be found there). The Antikythera mechanism has been studied and variously theorized over the past centutYi
using every available modern technology for the purpose, from xrays to the latest medical and physical scanning techniques (and
which mechanism, and despite all this study we by no means fully
understand) confirming Nietzsche's emphasis on the achievements of
ancient Greek science in not only theoretical detail but practical, 46
technological sophistication. 47
See, not with reference to Nietzsche, hut generally on this topic, Aage
Gerhardt Drachmann, The Mechanical Technology of Greek and Roman
Antiquity (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1963) in addition to John
Peter Oleson, The Oxford Handbook of Engineering and Technology in the
Classical World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).
4ii The practical and skeptical dimension in question led the Belgian philosopher Rene Berthelot to speak of Nietzsche as a pragmatist, comparing him to
Pierce and James hut not less and this is the most important for the context, to
Poincare. See Berthelot, Un romantisme utilitaire: etude sur Ie mouvement
pragmatiste. 1, Le pragmatisme chez Nietzsche et chez Poincare (Paris: F. Alcan, 1911).
47 See Derek de Solla Price, "An Ancient Greek Computer," in: The Scientific
American 200/6 (1959), pp.60-67 as well as his later "Automata and the
Origins of Mechanism and Mechanistic Philosophy," in: Technology and Culture, vol. 5/1 (1964), pp.9-23 and a decade later, for a summary of his research, see de Solla Price's "Gears from the Greeks: The Antikythera Mechanism-A Calendar Computer from ca. 80 B.C.," in: Transactions of the
American Philosophical Society (New Series), vol. 64/7 (1974), pp.1-70.
See, again, Aage Gerhardt Drachmann, The Mechanical Technology of Greek
and Roman Antiquity. For more recent discussions of the function of the
45
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Once again, the challenge facing Nietzsche's proposed plan to reweave the warp and woof of the fabric of Greek culture is that these
very same achievements themselves remain the object of ongoing
intellectual resistance to the claims of modem scholars (no matter
how conservative) as well as to Nietzsche's more nuanced claims
(there tends not to be an intersection of such claims inasmuch as
scholars, even Nietzsche scholars, tend not to know Nietzsche's
claims in general).
But even this scholarly circumstance is thematized in Nietzsche's
theory of what counts as scientific knowledge. For Nietzsche, familiarity is the essence of wh~t we take ourselves to know and the earmark of any knowledge claim. The goal of our knowledge, Nietzsche
writes again and again in his published and unpublished works, is
conscientiously reductive. We reduce the unknown to the known.
Nietzsche's most important corollary is that anywhere we are unable
to reduce the unknown to the known, we know--e.nd can knownothing.
Declaring in The Gay Sdence that "We simply lack any organ for
knowledge/'48 Nietzsche proposes to reflect upon what we take to be
knowledge, a reflection which entails a reflection on what knowledge
would have to be: regarded from a rigorous perspective or taking a
philosophical perspective on the question of knowledge (as of science)
from antiquity to Kant. From this critical perspective on knowledge,
claims to know simply mean that something strange has been reduced to something familiar." 49 Reduced to the familiar; it is also
eliminated from concern, thus we leave off questioning and it is just
when we cease to question (this is what Nietzsche called the problem
of science conceived as a problem, as problematic) that we take ourselves to know.
The oddity of the former point to be emphasized calls for attention. Nietzsche is asking us to reflect on what it might mean that the
/I

mechanism, supported with MRI technology, see Tony Freath et al., NDecoding the Ancient Greek Astronomical Calculator Known as the Antikythera
Mechanism," Nature. VoL 444 (2006), pp. 587-591. See here, again, Lucio
Russo, The Forgotten Revolution, p. 375f.
48 Friedrich Nietzsche, FW §354; KSA 3, p. 593.
49 Friedrich Nietzsche, FW §355; KSA 3, p. 593 f.
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Greeks could indeed as they did in fact and already possess every
theoretical, mathematical, and technical-engineering prerequisite for
the development of modern science without going on from these prerequisites to develop these same "preludes to science," as he famously
names them in his The Gay Science, into our own modern science?
As Nietzsche reminds us, Greek natural science was articulated from
the start from the perspective of "the natural sciences, in association
with mathematics and mechanics."SO Thus just from a modern scientific perspective, the Greeks ought to have been "on the best possible
road"51 to modern science but, sheerly historicallYi they weren't.
Once agaillt if they had evefything they needed, the technology, the
mathematics, the methodoloSYi no churchly antiscience piety,. what
on earth were they missing?
It is by raising such an explicitly Kantian genealogical discussion
of the necessary, as Nietzsche would always emphasize the prerequisites for science, that Nietzsche can question the iconic developmental
model of Western science as such. And to the same extent, the
Greeks, source of so much that we regard as the heart of Western
scientific culture, present a conundrum, a conundrum Nietzsche a1"ticulates in the spirit of his lifelong effort to raise the question of
science to (and in and with) his own science of philology.
What is required for the development of modern science? Will it
be mathematics? That the Greeks had, some say they invented it.52
Ditto for theory. As for technoloSYi the extant mechanisms in our
possessions, never mind the ones for which there is textual attestation, suggest that a lack of engineering technology is by no means the
answer.
Nietzsche's complex suggestion which he had to be sure been arguing since his first book on tragedy (where he also thematizes
science) is that modern science would need the Socratic faith in reason, the very same faith that would prove particularly resonant with
monotheistic religion: specifically the Judeo-Christian tradition as
Friedrich Nietzsche, AC §59; KSA 6, p. 247.
Ibid.
52 Scholars from Otto Neugebauer to G. E. R. Lloyd to John J. Cleary and so
on have explored this.
50
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such, add the promise of salvation and what emerges looks very like
the progress ideal of science.
Stylistically distant as it is from the more current reflections on
Greek scientific philosophy that can also be adduced in support of his
assertions, Nietzsche's claim is anything but obvious. And here, writing in his posthumously published Antichrist, although simUar reflections appear throughout his work, it is significant that Nietzsche
provides even less source material for his claims 53 than Nietzsche
offered for his discussion of the metric origins of tragedy out of the
spirit of music in The Birth of Tragedy. 54
In this sense, Nietzsche emphasizes the indispensabUity of religion for the development of modem science rather than and as is
commonly supposed its antipode. Indeed, as the medieval historian
Lynn White has also argued (here echoing Duhem) but also as the
historian of science Alistair Crombie has emphasized as did indeed
the phUosopher of science Stanley 1. Jaki and Patrick Heelan, modem
science remains a religiously indebted, Judeo-Christian undertaking.
Yet to argue for science's religious "preludes," to use Nietzsche's
terminology in The Gay Science, is not to argue that science itself is
overtly or conSciously "religious" or that it toes the line of religious
dogma. Instead by claiming in On the Genealogy of Morals that
science is the most developed form of the religious ascetic ideal,
Nietzsche argues that science (and here he includes the whole of
scholarship and its institutional enterprises) claims or presupposes
the very same orientation to the world as religion. 55 To say this is to
say that science stands in the place of religion. It's the next, best,
religious thing and it is what we believe in today.
Continuing the above noted references to ancient science, there is
a further tradition in the history of science importantly pioneered by
The references in the foregoing footnotes makes it plain that further documentation can be had if desired.
54 I offer a discussion of some of his reasons for this in Babette Babich, The
53

Hallelujah Effect .
Cf. Babette Babich, "Nietzsches Genealogie der Wissenschaft als Mythos:
Religion, Moral und die Werte der Moderne," in: Beatrix Vogel / Nikolaus
Gerdes, eds., Grenzen der RationalitCit. Teilband 1: Kolloquien 2005-2009
(Mtinchen: Allitera, 2011), pp. 305-338.
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Frances Yates and Betty Jo Teeter Dobbs and now and more recently
by Lawrence Principe among others who have explored the literary
and experimental basis of what Nietzsche names the "preludes" of
science S6 and our all-too-human-all-too-Alexandrine we might say
-taste for occult and secret powers, a taste that turns out to be less a
hindrance or a prejudice than indispensable for the cultivation not
only of the ideal or theoretical constructions of natural science but
its most practical or applied techniquesY Thus Nietzsche asks if
science itself could exist if lithe path" as he speaks of the "preludes
of science," had "not been prepared by magicians, alchemists, astrologers and witches whqse promises and pretensions first had to create
a thirst, a hunger, a taste for hidden and forbidden powers?"58
Nietzsche's more nuanced claim (and Heidegger takes this from
Nietzsche) is that modem science elevates itself contra religion to the
status of religion. If in antiquity, science was prized "as the means to
virtue/'s9 specifically modem science, like modem art, demands instead to be pursued for its own sake. 60 And just as the artist like the
Friedrich Nietzsche, FW §300; KSA 3, p. 538.
See for a recent, popular account of such scientific 'preludes' as Nietzsche
expresses these: Arthur Greenberg, From Alchemy to Chemistry in Picture
and Story (Cambridge: Wiley, 2007) in addition to Bruce Moran, Distil/ing
Knowledge: Alchemy, Chemistry, and the Scientific Revolution (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2005). In addition to Allen G. Debus, Alchemy and
Early Modern Chemistry: Papers from Ambix (Huddersfield: Jeremy Mills,
2004). See Lawrence Principe, The Aspiring Adept: Robert Boyle and his ALchemical Quest (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998) for other references.
58 Friedrich Nietzsche, FW §300; KSA 3, p.538f. Without mentioning
Nietzsche, the historian William Eamon confirms Nietzsche's account of the
forbidden, alchemical "Preludes of Science" in his book, Science and the Secrets of Nature: Books of Secrets in Early Modern Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996) as well as Peter Dear, The Intelligibility of Nature: How Science Makes Sense of the World (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2008).
59 Friedrich Nietzsche, FW §123; KSA 3, p. 479.
60 In this spirit, the historian of science, Peter Dear, characterizes "modern
science" (which he notes is often described by today's scholars as "technoscience" marking its practical or applied character) as a chimera or "hybrid"
for reasons similar to those Nietzsche recounts. In The Intelligibility of Nat-
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Christian seeks to be well-paid, so Nietzsche contends, so too we
modems-as Socrates taught us--expect that reason (aka science)
will 'improve' life. Scientific millenarians as we are today, we continue to invoke the advances of science (progress) and point to the
promise of funher benefits, unimaginable riches: heaven on eanh.
If Nietzsche's genealogical concern was the origin or binh of modern science, Nietzsche also raises the question of the general origins
of logic as such as indeed of modern, empirical science (and we note
that he distinguishes these). Here And we may conclude by recalling
Nietzsche's own closing remarks on methods of science in antiquity
asking his readers (as he typically does) if he has been understood:
"Does one comprehend this l Everything essential had been found in
order to begin to go to work." 61 In this way, Nietzsche's challenge to
conventional assumptions in The Antichrist do not depan from his
earliest concerns with the Socratic invention of reason in The Birth of
Tragedy and what he details as Alexandrian culture in his Untimely
Meditations. And yet he frames the question with uncharacteristic
force, especially for this master of rhetoric and subtlety. For
Nietzsche, we have lost the culture of antiquity along with the special
grace of its achievements. To the extent that the scholars themselves,
the philologists even as Nietzsche says and perhaps especially the
archaeologists, are to blame for this loss, Nietzsche invites us to think
outside the same scholarly box that always excluded his thinking.
both in his own day and in ours. And were we to accept his invitation:
what kind of revolution in thought might that inaugurate for us?

ure, Dear is more sober than Nietzsche, but he makes his point with increasing energy perhaps because he has repeatedly made the same point to (relatively) slim resonance in his several past books.
61 Friedrich Nietzsche, AC §59; KSA 6, p. 248.
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